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Luck and Moral Responsibility* 
Michael J. Zimmerman 
Considerable attention has recently been given to what has come to be 
called moral luck. It has been claimed that recognition of this phenomenon 
imperils the received conception of moral responsibility; some, indeed, 
have said that this conception must be revised in light of this recognition. 
The issue may be put in terms of a puzzle that revolves around the 
following argument: 
1. A person P is morally responsible for an event e's occurring only 
if e's occurring was not a matter of luck. 
2. No event is such that its occurring is not a matter of luck. 
Therefore 
3. No event is such that P is morally responsible for its occurring. 
The puzzle is supposed to reside in the fact that the premises seem true 
but the conclusion false. Reaction to the puzzle has been varied. Joel 
Feinberg, one of the first to pose the puzzle (though not exactly in these 
terms), seems prepared-at least provisionally-to accept the conclusion.' 
Thomas Nagel thinks that there is a genuine paradox here and seems 
prepared to accept both premises while denying the conclusion.2 Bernard 
Williams, while arguing forcefully for the truth of the second premise, 
appears to deny the first, claiming that such denial runs counter to the 
received conception of moral responsibility.3 Judith Andre likewise denies 
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action funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities and directed by Robert 
Audi at the University of Nebraska at Lincoln in the summer of 1984. I wish to thank in 
particular George Agich, Robert Audi, Margaret Urban Coyne, Philip Devine, Eric Russert 
Kraemer, Peter McInerney, Thomas Moody, and Mark Strasser for helpful comments on 
an earlier version. I am grateful also for the comments of some anonymous referees. 
1. At least, this seems to be the case in Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 34-37. This is not to say that Feinberg now 
accepts this conclusion or that his other writings commit him to it. 
2. Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 
pp. 37-38. This is undoubtedly a simplistic and insensitive way of putting Nagel's point, 
but I am at a loss to understand the final two pages of an otherwise admirably lucid article. 
Compare the note on p. 30 of Richard B. Brandt, "Blameworthiness and Moral Obligation," 
in Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. A. I. Melden (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1958), pp. 3-39. 
3. Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 
pp. 21 ff., including n. 11 on p. 36. Williams is concerned, notjust with moral responsibility, 
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the first premise but rejects the claim that this runs counter to the received 
conception of moral responsibility, contending that this conception has 
Aristotelian as well as Kantian elements and that the former, if not the 
latter, countenance luck.4 
In this paper I shall critically evaluate the foregoing argument. I 
shall present two versions of it and argue that neither version is compelling. 
These versions will be presented in Section I. In Section II the first version 
will be criticized. The second version-far more interesting than the 
first-will be discussed in Sections III-VII. 
I 
The sort of moral responsibility with which I am concerned here is that 
familiar, even if elusive, brand of responsibility which is the focal point 
of discussions concerning freedom and determinism. Such responsibility 
is commonly thought to have some essential link to freedom of will or 
action-a link which I have no wish to deny. In this sense of "responsibility," 
if someone is responsible for some event, then he is worthy of praise or 
blame for that event. Such praise and blame are of a particular, inactive 
sort, consisting in a positive or negative evaluation of the agent in light 
of the event in question. An agent is worthy of such praise or blame just 
in case such an evaluation of him would be accurate or true to the facts. 
Now, just what the precise nature of such praise and blame is, and just 
what the precise conditions of someone's being worthy of such praise 
and blame are, are of course matters which I cannot try to spell out here. 
Nevertheless, it is very important to note that such praise and blame are 
not actions but merely judgments, judgments about a person's moral 
standing or moral worth in light of the event in question. Not being 
actions, such judgments of praise and blame are not subject to moral 
justification (although, as judgments, they are subject to epistemic justi- 
fication). Active praising and blaming-actions which, typically, serve to 
express, and which thus presuppose, judgments of praise and blame- 
are, of course, subject to moral justification; that is, as actions, they may 
be morally right or morally wrong. There is thus a great difference 
between internal judgments of praise and blame and external or overt 
actions expressive of such judgments. It is solely with the former that I 
shall be concerned in this paper.5 
but with morality in general; but I think that his view is not distorted by the present 
restriction of it. The restriction is important; I wish to allow for the possibility that what 
is to be said about the relation between luck and the moral responsibility of persons is not 
to be said about the relation between luck and other aspects of morality (such as the 
rightness and wrongness of actions). 
4. Judith Andre, "Nagel, Williams, and Moral Luck," Analysis 43 (1983): 202-7, 
throughout, esp. pp. 206-7. Like Williams, Andre's concern is morality in general but, as 
with Williams, part of her concern is moral responsibility in particular. 
5. The distinction between inactive and active (praise and) blame has affinities with 
the distinction between "censure" and "reproof" given in Elizabeth L. Beardsley, "A Plea 
for Deserts," American Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1969): 33-42. 
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Now what, more exactly, is the issue concerning luck and such re- 
sponsibility? Nagel sets the scene well: 
Whether we succeed or fail in what we try to do nearly always 
depends to some extent on factors beyond our control. This is true 
of murder, altruism, revolution, the sacrifice of certain interests for 
the sake of others-almost any morally important act. What has 
been done, and what is morally judged, is partly determined by 
external factors. However jewel-like the good will may be in its own 
right, there is a morally significant difference between rescuing 
someone from a burning building and dropping him from a twelfth- 
storey window while trying to rescue him. Similarly, there is a morally 
significant difference between reckless driving and manslaughter. 
But whether a reckless driver hits a pedestrian depends on the 
presence of the pedestrian at the point where he recklessly passes 
a red light.6 
Nagel goes on to distinguish a variety of types of luck. For present 
purposes, just two types may be distinguished. I shall call these situational 
and resultant luck. The former consists in luck with respect to the situations 
one faces, including the nature of one's character (inclinations, capacities, 
and so on) as so far formed. The latter consists in luck with respect to 
what results from one's decisions, actions, and omissions.7 
Nagel explicitly ties the matter of luck in with the matter of control, 
and this seems right. Something which occurs as a matter of luck is 
something which occurs beyond anyone's control.8 But we should dis- 
tinguish two ways in which something may be beyond someone's control. 
Roughly, one may be said to enjoy restricted control with respect to some 
event just in case one can bring about its occurrence and can also prevent 
its occurrence. One may be said to enjoy unrestricted or complete control 
with respect to some event just in case one enjoys or enjoyed restricted 
control with respect both to it and to all those events on which its occurrence 
is contingent. Thus an event may be beyond someone's control either in 
the sense that it is not in his unrestricted control9 or in the stronger sense 
that it is not even in his restricted control. 
We thus arrive at two readings of the argument that constitutes the 
puzzle. First: 
la. P is morally responsible for e's occurring only if P was in restricted 
control of e. 
6. Nagel, p. 25. 
7. What I call situational luck comprises what in Nagel, p. 28, are called constitutive 
luck, luck in one's circumstances, and luck in how one is determined by antecedent cir- 
cumstances. What I call resultant luck corresponds with what Nagel calls luck in the way 
one's actions and projects turn out. 
8. More restrictively: something which occurs as a matter of luck with respect to 
someone P is something which occurs beyond P's control. 
9. Note how tempting it often is to say that one is not "really" or "fully" in control 
of an event e unless one is or was also in control of all those events on which the occurrence 
of e is contingent. Compare Feinberg, p. 35. 
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2a. No event is such that anyone is ever in restricted control of it. 
Therefore 
3. No event is such that P is morally responsible for its occurring. 
Second: 
lb. P is morally responsible for e's occurring only if P was in un- 
restricted control of e. 
2b. No event is such that anyone is ever in unrestricted control of 
it. 
Therefore 
3. No event is such that P is morally responsible for its occurring. 
But now, it seems to me, the puzzle disappears. I shall argue that neither 
version of the argument is persuasive. Statement 3 is not forced upon 
us; nor is our received conception of moral responsibility in need of 
revision. 
II 
The first version of the argument is easily dismissed. Both premises are 
problematic. There is reason to think that la is false, when "restricted 
control" is understood as just outlined.'0 But I shall not dwell on this, 
for two reasons. First, even if la is false, some interesting modification 
of it (where "restricted control" is understood in a sense different from, 
but closely related to, that just outlined) may well be true. Second, 2a is 
plainly false" (and seems likely to remain so no matter what reasonable 
construal is given to "restricted control"). For there are many things, it 
seems, of which I am in restricted control right now. For example: I now 
enjoy restricted control with respect to my thirst's being quenched (for 
there is a glass of water nearby). 
III 
The second version of the argument, while unsound, is more interesting; 
though easy to dismiss, it yet has undeniable force. And I suspect that 
it is this version that Feinberg, Williams, Nagel, and others have had in 
mind. Certainly, 2b seems true; in this sense, it must be admitted, luck 
(whether situational or resultant) is an ineliminable part of existence. For 
example, I can now quench my thirst, but this appears to depend (causally) 
on all sorts of things that are beyond anyone's restricted control, such 
as: the world having come into existence (a situational matter), the world 
not ceasing to exist before my throat reacts appropriately to the introduction 
of water (a resultant matter), and so on. 
But even if 2b is true, lb is surely false (and would remain so on any 
reasonable interpretation of "restricted control" other than, but closely 
10. See Harry G. Frankfurt, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,"Journal 
of Philosophy 66 (1969): 829-39; and MichaelJ. Zimmerman, "Moral Responsibility, Freedom, 
and Alternate Possibilities," Pacoic Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1982): 243-54. 
11. Unless hard determinism is true-and I am assuming that it is not. 
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related to, that just outlined), although both Feinberg and Nagel appear 
at times to accept it. For instance, Feinberg writes: "If he [the champion 
of moral responsibility] is a rational man, he will admit that moral re- 
sponsibility for external harm makes no sense and argue that moral 
responsibility is therefore restricted to the inner world of the mind, where 
the agent rules supreme and luck has no place.... Morals constitute a 
kind of internal law, governing those inner thoughts and volitions which 
are completely subject to the agent's control, and administered before 
the tribunal of conscience-theforum internum. '' 12 (Of course, Feinberg 
goes on to say, quite rightly, that even the inner domain of one's thoughts 
and volitions is not immune to luck, in that even it is not under one's 
complete, i.e., unrestricted, control.) And Nagel writes: "If the condition 
of control is consistently applied, it threatens to erode most of the moral 
assessments we find it natural to make. The things for which people are 
morally judged are determined in more ways than we at first realize by 
what is beyond their control. And when the seemingly natural requirement 
of fault or responsibility is applied in light of these facts, it leaves few 
pre-reflective moral judgments intact. Ultimately, nothing or almost 
nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control."' 3 And 
again: 
How is it possible to be more or less culpable depending on whether 
a child gets into the path of one's car, or a bird into the path of 
one's bullet? Perhaps it is true that what is done depends on more 
than the agent's state of mind or intention. The problem then is, 
why is it not irrational to base moral assessment on what people 
do, in this broad sense? It amounts to holding them responsible 
for the contributions of fate as well as for their own-provided 
they have made some contribution to begin with.... If the object 
of moral judgment is the person, then to hold him accountable for 
what he has done in the broader sense is akin to strict liability, 
which may have its legal uses but seems irrational as a moral po- 
sition.14 
Although there is, I think, an important element of truth in all of this, 
it also seems to me, at bottom, importantly mistaken. After all, lb is 
clearly false, if only because no one is in control of his being born-an 
event on which all of his decisions, actions, omissions, and the consequences 
thereof are contingent. And we all recognize this. Why should anyone 
think that our received conception of moral responsibility implies other- 
wise? 
What Feinberg and the others have latched on to is an important 
fact, and that is that we tend, for example, to praise and blame someone 
for a good or bad decision more than one who did not make the decision, 
12. Feinberg, p. 33. 
13. Nagel, p. 26. 
14. Ibid., p. 31. 
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even though the one who did not failed to do so only because he was 
distracted.'5 Similarly, we tend to blame someone who collaborated with 
the Nazis more than someone who did not, even though the one who 
did not failed to do so only because he did not have the opportunity to 
do so."6 Or again, we tend to praise someone who rescued a child from 
a burning building more than someone who did not, even though the 
one who did not failed to do so only because he did not have the opportunity 
to do so. These differential judgments, based on situational luck, have 
counterparts based on resultant luck. As Nagel notes, we tend to blame 
the reckless driver who hits a pedestrian more than the one who, through 
no merit of his own, avoids doing so; or again, we tend to praise the 
scientist who finds a cure for the common cold more than his colleague 
who, though equally dedicated to relieving the suffering of humanity, 
fails, through no moral fault of his own, to do so.17 Such differential 
judgment seems hard to justify. 
IV 
Indeed, such differential judgment would appear impossible to justify if 
the following principle were true: 
4. If (i) P brought about e, 
(ii) P* would have brought about e if e* had occurred, and 
(iii) e* was not in P*'s restricted control, 
then whatever credit or discredit accrues to P for bringing about 
e accrues also to P*.l8 
If 4 were true, then, it seems, the Nazi collaborator would be no more 
blameworthy than the non-, but would-be, collaborator; the rescuer of 
the child would be no more praiseworthy than the non-, but would-be, 
rescuer; the successful scientist would be no more praiseworthy than the 
unsuccessful scientist; the "successful" reckless driver would be no more 
blameworthy than the "unsuccessful" reckless driver; and so on. And the 
principle need not be restricted to moral credit and discredit. The case 
of the two scientists, for example, can easily be recast so that its primary 
concern is intellectual credit. Similarly, if Arnold deserves athletic credit 
for hitting a round of 67, then so, it seems, does Arnold*, who would 
have done the same but for a splitting headache. (Of course, Arnold will 
win the prize and Arnold* will not, but there seems to be no good reason 
to attribute a degree of intrinsic athletic excellence, or skill, to Arnold 
15. Feinberg, p. 35. 
16. See Nagel, p. 34. Nagel says: "We judge people for what they actually do or fail 
to do, not just for what they would have done if circumstances had been different." If 
"judge" is understood as "tend to judge," I would agree. But there is some indication that 
Nagel means notjust "judge" but "ought tojudge," and here I would disagree. See principle 
6 below and the commentary on it. Again, cf. Brandt, p. 30n. 
17. Nagel, p. 36, n. 11. 
18. Recall, with respect to clause iii, that whatever is not in one's restricted control is 
ipso facto also not in one's unrestricted control. 
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and not to Arnold*.) Or again, if the Sex Pistols deserve musical discredit 
for the cacophony they produced, then so, it seems, do the Sex Pistols*, 
who would have done the same but for chancing on the occasional eu- 
phonious chord. 
Perhaps it is something like 4 that Feinberg and others have in mind, 
and, indeed, its application to the foregoing cases seems to yield plausible 
judgments. But, of course, 4 is false; it is too broad, too strong. Let P 
be Mother Teresa and e be the action cf succoring cripples in Calcutta; 
let P* be me and e* be the event of my acquiring the character of Mother 
Teresa. It seems plausible to think that, given these conditions, 4 yields 
the result that I deserve the same credit that accrues to Mother Teresa. 
Or again, let P be Hitler and e be the action of exterminating millions 
of innocents; let P* be me and e* be the event of my acquiring the 
character of Hitler. It seems plausible to think that, given these conditions, 
4 yields the result that I deserve the same discredit that accrues to Hitler. 
These are preposterous results. 
Still, we must be careful to point upjust what it is that is preposterous 
about these results. To do this, I shall distinguish roughly between two 
senses of "character." First, there is one's "given character," that set of 
dispostions to feel, think, and act to which none of one's actions has 
contributed (and of which some may be innate). Then there is one's 
"character as so far formed," which comprises both one's given character 
and also those dispositions to feel, think, and act (if any) to which one 
has contributed by virtue of one's actions (and for which, therefore, one 
may bear some measure of moral responsibility; e.g., I may crave drugs 
now, but such a craving may well be of my own making in such a manner 
that I am responsible for it). Now, this is all very rough and is surely not 
without its problems. Nevertheless, it seems to me appropriate to point 
out that it is not obviously preposterous to praise (or blame) me as much 
as Mother Teresa (or Hitler) if I would have done what she (or he) did 
if only I had had her (or his) given character. What is preposterous is to 
accord me the same credit or discredit if I would have done what they 
did if, but only if, I had had their character as so far formed (insofar as 
this differs, as it presumably does, from their given character). 
Even if 4 is false, there is, I submit, something intuitively appealing 
about it, and perhaps some modification of it, where its antecedent is 
restricted by further conditions, is acceptable. But it is very difficult to 
figure out just what modification this is. One must beware of the trivial. 
For instance, the necessity of not engaging in differential judgment re- 
garding Arnold and Arnold* would clearly be yielded by a version of 4 
whose antecedent included the condition that P and P* possess the same 
athletic skills; such a version would be uninformative, however. I suspect 
that any interesting modifications of 4 must be drawn up piecemeal: 
what is pertinent to athletic discreditt may not be pertinent to intellectual, 
musical, or moral discrediti, and so on. Henceforth, I shall concern 
myself solely with moral discrediti. 
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V 
Rather than try to draw up a single version of 4 which pertains to all 
types of situation concerning the implications of moral luck on the ascription 
of moral (dis)credit, I shall divide the task into two segments: the drawing 
up of such a principle first where it is resultant luck that is at issue and 
then where it is situational luck that is at issue. This task will be facilitated 
by presupposing a certain rough (very rough) picture of action which I 
cannot seek to defend here.'9 The picture is this: action consists in an 
agent's making a decision and this decision's causing a certain event. Free 
action is simply action in which the decision is free. This is a very familiar 
and surely plausible picture, despite the attempts of Wittgenstein and 
his followers to ridicule it. 
With this rough picture in mind, I propose the following two principles, 
drawn up in the spirit of 4 but more adequate than it, though doubtless 
still too rough and problematic. The first pertains to resultant luck: 
5. If (i) P made decision d in what he believed to be situation s, 
(ii) e resulted from P's making d, 
(iii) e's resulting from P's making d was not in P's restricted 
control (except insofar as P's making d was in P's restricted 
control), 
(iv) P* made the same decision d in what he believed to be 
the same situation s, 
(v) e did not result from P*'s making d, and 
(vi) e's resulting from P*'s making d was not in P*'s restricted 
control (except insofar as P*'s making d was in P*'s restricted 
control), 
then whatever moral credit or discredit accrues to P for bringing 
about e accrues also to P*. 
The second principle pertains to situational luck: 
6. If (i) P made d in what he believed to be s, 
(ii) P* would have made d if he had been in a situation that 
he believed to be s, and 
(iii) P*'s being in a situation that he believed to be s was not 
in his restricted control, 
then whatever moral credit or discredit accrues to P for making 
d accrues also to P*. 
Now, these principles are still vague; but I do not wish to argue for them 
here, although I do advocate acceptance of them (or of something like 
them). My purpose, rather, is to highlight an important limitation to 5 
and 6, a limitation that they have despite their being expressly designed 
to neutralize-as, indeed, they do neutralize-the role of luck in the 
ascription of moral responsibility. 
19. It is defended in detail in Michael J. Zimmerman, An Essay on Human Action (New 
York: Peter Lang, 1984). 
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The point is simply this: 5 and 6, though very powerful in terms of 
the neutralization of luck, do not entail that lb is true. And so we are 
still not constrained to accept 3, even if we accept 2b, 5, and 6. It is 
extremely important to distinguish the claim, for example, that the col- 
laborator and the noncollaborator are equally to blame from the claim 
that neither deserves any blame. The latter does not follow from the 
former without some further premise to the effect either that the col- 
laborator deserves no blame or that the noncollaborator deserves no 
blame. Nagel, in his talk of strict liability, seems to embrace the claim 
that the noncollaborator deserves no blame and, from this together with 
the claim that differential judgment in this case is unjustified, infers that 
the collaborator also deserves no blame.20 Feinberg seems prepared to 
accept this conclusion also. But I reject it; for I reject the claim that the 
noncollaborator deserves no blame. I would argue, on the contrary, that 
because differential judgment in this case seems unjustified, and because 
the collaborator deserves blame, therefore the noncollaborator deserves 
blame also. Analogous remarks pertain to the cases of the rescuer and 
the nonrescuer, the two scientists, and the two reckless drivers. If there 
is unfairness in the differential judgments which we commonly tend to 
make in such cases-as I believe there is and as, according to 5 and 6, 
there is-then, I believe, this unfairness does not consist in ascribing 
moral responsibility to one of the parties involved but, rather, in not 
ascribing it to the other. 
The question arises, however: what is it that we are to hold the 
noncollaborator, the nonrescuer, the unsuccessful scientist, and the un- 
successful reckless driver responsible for? I shall answer this by stages, 
dealing first with resultant luck and then with situational luck. 
VI 
It has been noted that resultant luck is ineliminable. One is never in 
complete control of the consequences of one's actions and omissions. 
The successful reckless driver was not in restricted control of the pedestrian's 
decision to take a walk, and hence not in unrestricted control of the death 
that resulted from the accident. But I find nothing in this observation 
to prompt a retraction of any ascription of blame to the driver. Why 
blame the successful reckless driver for the pedestrian's death? Let us 
suppose that his recklessness is due to drunkenness. Then, we may suppose, 
he was free not to drink, and hence free not to drive drunkenly, and 
hence free not to run over the pedestrian. Surely this suffices, ceteris 
paribus, for blaming him for the death.2' That is, the death serves as an 
20. At the same time, Nagel seems to acknowledge the justifiability of blaming the 
collaborator. See n. 2 above. 
21. The "ceteris paribus" clause is not unproblematic, but I shall not try to fill it in 
here. It includes such conditions as the driver not being a three-year-old, and so on. Note 
that if the driver were not free not to drink-if he were an alcoholic, say-there might be 
reason not to blame him for the death. But I am assuming that he is not an alcoholic. 
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indication that, it is a reflection of the fact that, the driver is to be 
evaluated negatively on this occasion. Now, of course, if the driver had 
luckily escaped hitting anyone, there would be no death to serve as an 
indication that he is to be evaluated negatively; he would not, in other 
words, be to blame for any death. But there would nevertheless be occasion 
to evaluate him negatively, and one event which would indicate this 
would be his decision to drink, knowing that he would subsequently drive. 
He would, in other words, be to blame for this decision, one that he was 
free not to make. (See clause iv of 5.) This, I submit, is perfectly in 
keeping with the received conception of moral responsibility. 
But someone might object as follows. I have said that the successful 
driver is to blame for the pedestrian's death, while the unsuccessful one 
is not. I have said that the unsuccessful one is to blame for his decision 
to drink and drive. But surely the successful one is also to blame for his 
decision to drink and drive. Thus there is nothing for which the unsuccessful 
driver is to blame that the successful one is not, but there is something 
for which the successful driver is to blame that the unsuccessful one is 
not. Hence the successful driver is more to blame than the unsuccessful 
one after all. In response to this I need only point out the need to 
distinguish between "P is to blame for more events than P*" and "P is 
more to blame than P*." The successful driver is to blame for more 
events than the unsuccessful one-more events serve to indicate that he 
is to be evaluated negatively on this occasion-but this does not imply 
that he is to be evaluated negatively to a greater extent than is the 
unsuccessful driver.22 
Of course, given that the successful driver is no more to blame than 
the unsuccessful driver, then it must be admitted that, from the point 
of view of ascribing moral responsibility, it does not matter whether or 
not the terrible event-the death-comes about as a result of the decision 
to drink and drive, as long as the decision itself occurs. But, again, this 
does not imply that the successful driver is not to blame for the death. 
The death indicates the need for a negative evaluation only indirectly, 
as it were, while the decision indicates it directly; but an indirect indication 
22. Williams's interesting remarks concerning what he calls agent-regret need to be 
addressed here (see Williams, pp. 27-30). Contrary to what Williams seems to suggest, it 
is not morally appropriate for the successful driver to regret what he has done more than 
the unsuccessful driver regrets what he has done. (In our world, such unsuccessful drivers 
are all too ready not to feel the appropriate degree of regret.) At least, this is so for intrinsic 
appropriateness. We can, of course, admiit that it can be extrinsically morally appropriate 
for a successful driver to feel a greater degree of regret than an unsuccessful one. Suppose 
that the successful driver had not been at fault in causing the pedestrian's death. If (in an 
intrinsically appropriate manner) he had shown no more regret than an unsuccessful driver 
would have done in similar circumstances, we might be warranted in being suspicious. For 
it is unlikely that anyone in such a position can turn regret off in a manner which is 
intrinsically appropriate to the circumstances; and thus the successful driver's showing no 
regret here would be an indication that he would have shown no regret in circumstances 
where it was intrinsically called for (cf. Nagel, pp. 28-29). 
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is still an indication. While the death that results is not itself the occasion 
of a fresh negative evaluation, it nevertheless reflects the fact that some 
negative evaluation is called for. Moreover, we may still say that the 
successful driver did something wrong that the unsuccessful driver did 
not do, namely, run over a pedestrian. For this reason we may accept 
that Nagel is correct in saying that there is something "morally significant" 
about the difference between reckless driving and manslaughter, while 
consistently cleaving to 5, that is, whiLe consistently denying that this 
makes a difference with respect to moral responsibility. 
VII 
Similar remarks pertain to situational luck, although it requires somewhat 
different treatment. Such luck, again, is ineliminable. One is never in 
complete control of the situations that one faces, either with respect to 
"external" matters such as being born, being of a certain physical con- 
stitution, being distracted by a loud noise, being in a certain geographical 
location, and so on, or with respect to "internal" matters such as being 
irascible, suffering from an Oedipus complex, having a kindly disposition, 
and so on. And all of these matters affect what one does. It is against 
them as a background that one makes the decisions that one does; indeed, 
without such a background, no decisions could be made. Nevertheless, 
as long as the decision, for example, to collaborate is made freely, then 
one is surely, ceteris paribus, to blame for such collaboration.23 But, if 
the noncollaborator is just as much to blame, what is he to blame for? 
Not collaboration, clearly; and in this case there is not even the decision 
to collaborate. In this regard the noncollaborator is significantly different 
from the unsuccessful driver.24 I am not sure what the answer to the 
question is. Perhaps we should say simply that the noncollaborator is to 
blame but just not to blamefor anything; or perhaps we should say that 
he is to blame for being such that he would have made the decision to 
collaborate had he been in a situation that he believed to be s (where s 
is the situation that the collaborator believed himself to be in). 
If we say the latter, the link that many have claimed to exist between 
moral responsibility and freedom of will or action becomes quite prob- 
lematic. Many seem to have supposed that, if P is morally responsible 
for e's occurring, then e was either a free action or a consequence of a 
free action of P's. But the noncollaborator's being such that he would 
have made the decision to collaborate under the conditions specified was 
clearly not an action of his and might very well not have been a consequence 
of an action of his; and, certainly, 6 does not require that this characteristic 
of the noncollaborator have been either of these things in order for him 
23. Again, the "ceteris paribus" clause is not unproblematic. See n. 21 above. 
24. Compare Feinberg, p. 35, where Feinberg says (of feelings rather than decisions), 
"[A person] can no more be responsible for a feeling he did not have than for a death that 
did not happen." 
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to be as much to blame as the collaborator. Is there then no essential 
link between freedom and moral responsibility? This, I think, would be 
too hasty a conclusion. The link can be restored, albeit in different guise, 
simply by altering clauses i and ii of 6 so that they read "freely made" 
instead of just "made" and by adding that P* had the capacity to act 
freely. I would support such emendation, although I shall not seek to 
defend it here (just as I have not sought to defend principles such as 
4-6 in general), except to point out that it seems manifestly unfair to 
blame (and so, also, to praise) an object, even an agent, that lacks the 
capacity to act freely.25 
It must of course be acknowledged that there is a further problem 
with 6, and that is its incorporation of the counterfactual in clause ii. 
The truth conditions of such counterfactuals are notoriously difficult to 
determine. This difficulty is due to one of two things: either such coun- 
terfactuals have no truth value, or empirical verification of them is very 
hard to come by. Of course, if the former is ever the case, then 6 is 
vitiated, or at least its scope is restricted to covering whatever counterfactuals 
(if any) are of the relevant form and do have a truth value. In such a 
case, Feinberg and the others are successfully rebutted simply in virtue 
of this fact, at least with respect to certain instances of situational luck, 
unless they can find an alternative to 6 that does not suffer from the 
same problem. But I am dubious whether any of the relevant counter- 
factuals are in fact without truth value; it seems much safer simply to 
say that their empirical verification is very hard to come by. After all, 
one can imagine setting up controlled laboratory conditions in order to 
test the noncollaborator's propensity to collaborate and being able to 
draw a fairly well founded conclusion as to the truth value of the relevant 
counterfactual. 
VIII 
In sum, I accept that freedom of decision is crucial to the ascription of 
moral responsibility and thus to the ascription of praise and blame. Even 
if we grant Feinberg and the others, as I am prepared to do, that it is 
unfair to engage in differential judgment in the cases cited earlier, still 
there is room for praise and blame. Insofar as what happens after one 
has made a free decision is, in a sense, up to nature, then these events, 
while perhaps serving as indirect indicators of praise and blame, are 
strictly dispensable in the assessment of moral responsibility. (Of course, 
these events might be quite relevant when trying to determine the moral 
25. There is another sort of unfairness-not in judgment, but in fact-which seems 
to me to rest in the fact that an unfree object (whether animate or not) never has the 
opportunity to distinguish itself (or to disgrace itself) in such a way as to deserve praise 
(or blame). In this sense, the world is unjust. Compare Joel Feinberg, Rights, Justice, and 
the Bounds of Liberty (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 276-77, n. 7, 
on a comparative conception of cosmic injustice. Compare also Nagel, pp. 33-34, including 
n. 9. 
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justifiability of active praise and blame and of the meting out of rewards 
and punishments, but that is a separate matter entirely.)26 But the decision 
itself is not at all irrelevant; on the contrary, it is, one might say, the 
fulcrum of such ascription. And this is true even in those cases where 
no decision was made (as with the noncollaborator) but where one would 
have been made but for some stroke of fate or fortune. 
Thus my reaction to the puzzle posed at the outset of this paper 
differs from the reactions of others. In many ways, but not all, my position 
is a Kantian one, although this is not something that I wish to dwell on. 
Still, like Kant, I think that our received conception of moral responsibility 
requires both that the role of luck be neutralized and that it nevertheless 
be possible for someone to be morally responsible for an event's occurring. 
These requirements are, I believe, quite consistent with one another.27 
And so, unlike Feinberg, I unhesitatingly reject 3. Unlike Nagel, I do 
not believe both 1 and 2 to be acceptable (unless there is equivocation 
on "luck"). Unlike Williams, I do not think that any radical revision of 
our conception of moral responsibility is called for, even though I agree 
that the proper conception appears not to be a purely Kantian one.28 And 
unlike Andre, I believe that this conception is not essentially Aristotelian, 
even though not purely Kantian. 
26. Compare Nagel, p. 29, where the matters are not kept separate. The matters are 
related, of course. 
27. Still, see n. 25 above. 
28. See Bernard Williams, Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1973), p. 228, where Williams accuses Kant of embracing absurdity when he (Kant) talks 
of a self which is not empirically conditioned. I agree that such talk is highly suspect, but 
none of what I have said in this paper commits me to such talk. 
